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Response
David Hopper
Our present ecological, environmental consciousness is a relatively
recent phenomenon. It is important to establish the historical background of the development of this awareness, this consciousness, in
order to gain perspective on how we talk about it—what kind of hopes
and solutions we can entertain with regard to the problems that occasion our current concerns. Professor McFague did not do this in her
paper, so let me provide some historical basis for our discussion. It is
important to establish such a background in order to assess and
respond to Professor McFague’s ideas. I will then follow this historical
excursus with a summation of what I take to be the main lines of Professor McFague’s argument, followed by a critique thereof. I will conclude with a very brief statement of my own views on the subject at
hand.
I. Historical Background
Many see Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring1 as a turning point in the development of broad, public consciousness and concern about the natural
environment. Carson eloquently described the destructive impact of
the agricultural use of DDT on the food chain and various animal populations, especially birds. In the aftermath of the dropping of the two
atomic bombs at the end of World War II, the world woke to a new
reality: the possibility of human, social self-destruction. This new concern about potential destruction was subsequently caught up in, and
accentuated by, the political East-West struggle — the Cold War. What
Rachel Carson accomplished with her book was to parallel the new
awareness of potential, catastrophic destruction through war with her
own description of a real and growing destruction of elements of the
natural world through commonplace, seemingly benign, agricultural
practices. General awareness of other technological abuses of nature
came to light during the Vietnam years of 1965–72. Those years helped
to spawn an antitechnology “counterculture” movement that contributed in turn, in 1970, to the institution of the first Earth Day event, a
broadly reported protest celebration designed to promote appreciation
and preservation of the natural environment.
Then in 1973, the Arab-Israeli War led to an embargo by the Arab
nations on oil shipments to the West, forcing widespread recognition
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of the growing dependency upon and competition for the world’s limited natural resources. In the following year, the shortage of chemical
fertilizers, an offshoot of the energy crisis, aggravated greatly the serious crop failures in the Soviet Union, India, and elsewhere, which
made for a worldwide food shortage. In the course of this 1973 – 75
energy and food crisis, ethical debate in the West, and also in the Third
World, erupted around the ideas of triage and “lifeboat ethics.” Aid to
poor countries, some argued, should be made conditional upon steps
to limit population growth. Within the developed countries, especially
in the United States, some voices called for radical cutbacks in extravagant lifestyles, major reductions in consumption, and the adoption of
what was at the time called “voluntary simplicity,” a lifestyle that
extolled the idea that “less can be more.” Subsequently, scientific monitoring of the earth’s atmosphere from bases in Antarctica and by
means of satellite observations during the 1980s and 1990s established
the now widely accepted fact of an increasing degradation of the
earth’s atmosphere in terms both of the thinning of its ozone layer and
the accumulation of greenhouse gases. Recent international conferences have stressed the need to address these problems and the likelihood of impending significant climate changes as a result of such
atmospheric changes. This cluster of scientific and historical events lies
behind the growing general concern about dangers to, and the need to
preserve, the health of planet earth.
It is important to consider, as a second feature of this history, an
additional scholarly contribution, one that followed closely the work
of Rachel Carson and that added a significant new dimension to the
ethical discussion of the environmental question. Well before the onset
of the 1973 – 75 energy and food crisis, historian Lynn White Jr., in two
essays written four years apart, offered a historical analysis that provided and continues to provide a provocative interpretation of ethical,
theological dimensions of the ecological problem. In the first essay,
“What Accelerated Technological Progress in the Western Middle
Ages?” White, with abundant historical evidence, argued that the
Western Middle Ages underwent a significant, accelerating technological development during the sixth through the fifteenth centuries, a
cumulative change that placed the peoples of Western Europe in the
forefront of technological development and innovation by the end of
that period.2 This transformation occurred in stages and in diverse economic-political arenas: first in agriculture, then in military technology,
and, finally and most impressively, in the exploitation of the natural
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forces of wind and water for production purposes. Windmills and
waterwheels sprang up all over Northern Europe from the eleventh
through the fifteenth centuries. First adapted extensively for milling
grains, waterwheels were applied to sawing lumber, cutting stone,
even polishing precious gems. White hypothesized — on the model of
Max Weber’s exploration of the roots of modern capitalism — that special features in Western Christianity, different from the Christianity of
the East, underlay what he regarded as a strikingly distinctive economic-historical development.
One of the factors White identified as playing a key role in this
development was the rise of the cult of saints, which, he suggested,
gradually displaced traditional, tribal, animistic beliefs and practices.
This development, White proposed, encouraged a generalized disenchantment of nature. He argued, in addition, that Western monasticism distinctively developed an integration of work and piety not
found in Eastern Christianity or elsewhere. He suggested that the integration of physical labor with scholarly work in the monastic communities of the West made those communities into centers of
technological innovation and diffusion. As he expressed it in 1963,
“The monks were the first large group of intellectuals to get dirt under
their fingernails: surely a fact related to the growth of technology.”3 He
concluded that this combination of factors led to an ethos that sought
to substitute, wherever possible, a power machine for forms of human
labor regarded as demeaning for a “child of God.”
White expressed a very positive picture of the development of technology in the West and attempted to underscore the humane motivations that inspired it. Four years later, however, White’s mood and
outlook abruptly changed. In 1967, he published a very influential and
widely quoted article titled “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological
Crisis.”4 In this later piece, White blamed Christianity (and less explicitly Judaism) for the current ecological crisis, saying that its disregard
for nature led to the degradation of the environment. White singled
out for note Genesis 1:28, in which God tells Adam and Eve to “be
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over every living thing that moves
upon the earth.”5 In the context of this quotation, White broadly
asserted, “By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible
to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural
objects.”6 He suggested that the ecological crisis would continue until
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there was a revision, or abandonment, of the “Christian axiom” that
nature’s chief function was to serve the needs of humankind.
One is prompted to ask at this point: What occasioned this striking
turnaround in White’s point of view? A possible explanation — apart
from the growing technological angst expressed by Rachel Carson
along with the antitechnology declamations of the 1962 Berkeley-centered Student Power Movement — was a very prominent theological
celebration of secularity and the disenchantment of nature found in
Harvey Cox’s 1965 bestseller The Secular City. It is not often that a theological work makes it to the New York Times Best Sellers list, but Cox’s
book accomplished that feat and stirred widespread discussion in
1965 – 66. Cox argued that the dynamic, liberating life of the modernday “secular city,” in contrast to restrictive town life, had positive religious roots and that twentieth-century Christians should lay aside the
guilt-inducing notion that every human relationship should manifest
“I-Thou” dimensions. Along with the major themes of a “desacralization of politics” and a “deconsecration of values,” Cox argued that the
Biblical account of creation inspired a “disenchantment of nature,” a
development that freed at least a portion of humanity from the religious anxiety of a continuing need to placate a nature-based spirit
world.
It is speculative, but plausible, to suggest that Lynn White’s change
of mind about a “disenchantment of nature” was in part a reaction to
Cox’s overexuberant celebration of secularity. White’s counter, in his
1967 article, was a proposal to encourage a “re-enchantment” of
nature. He expressed regret at the loss of certain aspects of primitive
animism, a loss which, he concluded, fostered “indifference to the feelings of natural objects.” Against such an attitude, he put forward the
figure of St. Francis of Assisi. The thirteenth-century founder of the
Franciscan order was offered as model of a respectful, even worshipful, attitude toward and relationship with nature. Widespread theological discussion followed the publication of White’s article, especially in
the context of the Vietnam War. Certainly, White’s influential articles
played a role in helping to initiate interest in and concern for an “ecologically sound” theology. His call for a re-enchantment of nature has
met with positive responses from a number of theologians and ethicists while also furthering awareness among a broader, more-informed
public.
As suggested earlier, however, the later, worldwide energy and
food crisis of 1973 – 75 triggered an additional round of debate. Some
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ecologically concerned persons spoke out at the time against long-term
programs of food aid to needy nations. The 1973 – 75 crisis seemed to
portend an enduring problem, which some felt would only be accentuated by ongoing efforts at food relief for overpopulated areas around
the world, especially in the Third World countries with the highest
population growth rates. By using the image of an overcrowded
lifeboat, some suggested that the effort to rescue everyone would only
end in capsizing the lifeboat itself. The ecologically concerned biologist
Garret Hardin provoked international controversy by suggesting this
lifeboat metaphor, one which implied that the affluent, economically
developed nations of the world were the decision-making occupants of
the lifeboat. Hardin argued that the well-being and survival of posterity called for difficult decisions about population control of peoples
and nations who had exhausted the carrying capacity of their environments. At international population and food conferences in 1973 and
1974, representatives from Third World countries rejected Hardin’s
propositions and replied that developed nations were consuming a
disproportionate share of the earth’s resources. Philosophical and religious ethicists made the issues of survival and justice the main focus of
these discussions.
I suggest that, with his earlier analysis of technological development, White posed and paradigmatically framed the key problem of
the relationship between ecology and justice. For White, however,
technological advance, the bearer of his 1963 justice concerns, was
called into question by his later ecological convictions, which he felt
needed to be addressed by altering spiritual perceptions about the natural environment. What is of special note about these ethical debates in
the 1970s is that arguments and counterarguments about survival and
justice were framed in the face of an immediate crisis that was perceived to have long-term import.
*****
This short history of a relatively recent discussion of ecology-and-justice issues provides background for consideration of Professor
McFague’s paper. Many of the questions she raises and solutions she
proposes have a history that extends back at least thirty years. What is
new to the present discussion is the reality of the further development
of a global economy, which has made for a much greater degree of economic interdependence, with new centers of economic power in Asia
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and elsewhere. This growing interdependence makes improbable the
talk about triage and lifeboat ethics that occurred in the 1970s. What is
also new is that the shift to the problem of climate change has, in turn,
altered important features of the debate. Climate changes are global
and impact all peoples in a variety of different ways. The climate question is likely to renew a worldwide concern about food supplies if
global warming proceeds apace. Major themes struck in the 1970s
debate about energy and food clearly carry over to the climate question.
Professor McFague, however, also brings to the discussion of ecology the added dimension of more recent ecofeminist concerns about
ecology and justice. Here, she forges a link — one found in liberation
theologies — between the survival question and the equity question as
it pertains to the situation of the poor and oppressed. She sees the ecological issue joined to the situation of the “poor Third World woman...
of color” — the latter certainly a real and pressing ethical question. She
suggests that the situation of the poor woman of color is a “barometer
of the health of humanity and of nature” (italics mine).7 The ecofeminist
argument that she offers is that the treatment of women in any society
is a correlate, an index, of the treatment of nature in that same society;
i.e., it is attributable to a male gender bias among the power elite of the
developed, economically dominant nations. Professor McFague
describes the poverty-bound woman of the Third World in the following terms: “She does not have the power to direct the planet’s dwindling resources for her own use. In her increasing poverty, we see also
the growing poverty of the earth.”8 Professor McFague goes on to say
that “the male gaze, the anthropocentric gaze, and the colonial gaze
are similar.”9 With such phrasing she associates, if not links, the question of social, gender injustice to the abuse of the environment.
What I take to be the burden of Professor McFague’s discussion of
climate change is a call for a changed consciousness with regard to our
relationship to the environment. She calls for a heightened human
appreciation, especially among people in the developed countries, of
the givenness of the natural world and a lessening of our exploitative
disposition toward that world. Overall, Professor McFague offers a
number of different solutions for altering Christian, First World and
general human consciousness about the natural environment and the
correlative issue of social justice.
In addressing Christians and people of Biblical persuasion, Professor McFague seeks to counter the negative impress of Lynn White’s
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focus upon Genesis 1:28 and its injunction to humans to “subdue the
earth” and exercise “dominion” over animal life. She proposes instead
the idea that the frequent mention in the Genesis account of God looking upon the various acts of creation and declaring them “good”
enjoins people to enjoy aesthetically the world of nature. Thus, in place
of the mandates of dominion and subjugation, Professor McFague proposes aesthetic appreciation. Referring to her own personal childhood
experiences with nature, she suggests that an innate love of nature is
fixed in all of us and that this innate love needs only to be unleashed or
cultivated in order to better our appreciation of the world and to allay
our tendency to exploit and abuse nature. Such a shift in consciousness
or disposition, she suggests, would then undergird a resolve by Christian people—and others as well—to deal more actively and personally
with problems posed by the ecological crisis. This meaning is brought
home with a quote from the Dalai Lama to the effect that “human
beings have a ‘natural affection’ for the earth....”10
To accent this theme Professor McFague adds other appeals as well.
At one point, she seems to fall back on prescriptive admonition as a
means of correcting current behavior. In response to a developing consensus within the scientific community on the matter of global warming, she urges her hearers “to get out of denial and act. At the very
least . . . to stabilize emissions in order to avert the most severe climate
impacts.” And, she says, “since we created the problem, presumably,
we can do something about it. We can improve energy efficiency,...But
we must have the will to act.”11 And later, in connection with the
nature-embracing spirituality she proposes, she says that “a will to
change is a critical first step toward such a spirituality.”12 There are
important ethical differences between prescriptive admonition, aesthetic appreciation, and/or an innate love of nature, but all are
appealed to as components of a proposed alteration of behavior and
outlook.
Aware that there is significant difference between a prescriptive call
to conscience and aesthetic enjoyment, Professor McFague softens the
tone of the former by restoring perhaps a third or fourth motivational
source for changing attitudes toward the environment. This I would
term a kind of personalistic appeal. She notes that a World Council of
Churches study advocates “strong legislation, fear of consequences,
lobbying groups,” and the inner “pressure of conscience” as actions
necessary to change — but then she says that she would add the inner
pressure “of love.” “People,” she remarks, “do change some because
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they feel they must, but they change most when they want to. We need
a transformation of heart and soul, not just of will — we need a transformation of how we see our place in the scheme of things.”13 Here
Professor McFague proposes the central point in her argument: that we
must transform our consciousness from one dominated by a subjectobject mindset to a subject-subjects mindset. By the latter, she means
that our consciousness should take on a personalistic, relational orientation that takes in not only other human subjects but the subjecthood
of all aspects of nature: animal and plant, organic and inorganic. By
this I take Professor McFague to be embracing a project of consciousness alteration, a kind of Enlightenment doctrine of human salvation
through human design, in this case not so much a reshaping of the
social order as with the French philosophes, but of our own internal
environment, our consciousness, as a means of assuring a happy,
“abundant” future.
II. The Subject-Object Problem
I believe what I have outlined above is a fair representation of Professor McFague’s argument. Let me now turn to some questions about
and rejoinders to her paper. I respond to three points—points I believe
to be of general interest and not overly arcane in a theological sense. At
the start, however, let me say that I have a little trouble with the
metaphor of “the loving eye vs. the arrogant eye.” It lacks precision for
me, since I associate arrogance, rightly or wrongly, with a demeanor
more than with a glance or a look. I need some uttered words, or a
behavior, in order to identify arrogance. I think I know what is
intended by the metaphor, but I believe that it is possible to associate
lust with a look at a distance, but less so arrogance. “Locking eyes,” of
course, can signify lust as well as love. But then, if we go this way, with
lust in place of arrogance, we are very much caught in a general
human condition, one in which we all seem involved—rather like covetousness. The Tenth Commandment speaks against covetousness.
Luther believed covetousness catches everyone. The metaphor carries
Professor McFague’s meaning, but inadequately so.
The first major point of my critique centers on Professor McFague’s
denigration of the subject-object relationship, which she and others
identify as the chief villain of our time, a source of oppression within
both the social and natural order. The second point fixes on her reading of Buber in particular and the tradition of theism in general. And
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the third is the consciousness-shaping nature of her project and what I
consider to be some limits of such a project.
Let me begin with a discussion — and something of a defense — of
the subject-object relationship and examine why it has been blamed as
perhaps the major contributing cause of many of our current ecological
and social problems. As I understand the chief lines of this argument,
it is believed that the delineation of distance from an object of knowledge or another person (as “other”) serves chiefly the function of domination. Such a delineation allows, nay serves, the purpose of
manipulation and control of the object and simultaneously functions
as self-enhancement for the “objectifier.” Descartes (1596 – 1650) is frequently singled out as being especially guilty of this attitude, since he
attempted philosophically to systematize this subject-object reasoning
and suggested that not only planetary bodies in the Copernican cosmology should be viewed as functioning on the model of a machine
(orderly, predictable motion), but so should animals.
The complaint against the development of subject-centered, objectivist thinking in Western philosophy — along with attitudes and
behaviors supposedly instilled by it — was, in the past, most commonly voiced by philosophical advocates of neo-Thomism and Aristotelianism; but, in more recent times, the complaint has been taken up
by a number of feminist and postmodernist thinkers who have seen in
the subject-object dichotomy an inevitable, exploitative intent and outcome. Without contesting the point that power — social, political, and
ideological — is a matter of critical ethical concern and that its concealed modes of operation make it difficult to track, I think it is
nonetheless important to try to sort out epistemological from ideological interests and concerns in this matter. And, in regard to sixteenthand seventeenth-century efforts to achieve distance from inherited
schemes of understanding, it is essential to keep in mind the great significance of the cosmological revolution as the context for the work of
Descartes.
While it is possible, I suppose, to view the struggle over the Copernican displacement of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic astronomy as some
sort of power struggle — as clearly it was vis-à-vis the power of the
Church and its efforts to preside over the totality of a culture — it can
also be viewed as an honest and, at times, disquieting quest for understanding. The knowledge of how the heavens worked did not have an
immediate payoff for exploitative, materialist goals and purposes. That
is not to say that Galileo did not turn a nice profit by entering the tele-
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scope business, but what I suggest here is that understanding and
curiosity about the world is also a human and an ennobling pursuit.
The studied attempt to stand back from an inherited world and to try
to see things anew was, and is, part of what the subject-object polarity
has meant and continues to mean. It is conducive to criticism, even
self-criticism. It confronts people at times with the challenging necessity of having to view the world in a way that is counter to their own
inclinations and wishes. Sometimes the new way of viewing is a
painful, disruptive thing. For example, what I find attractive and
provocative about the story of Johannes Kepler and his formulation of
the laws of planetary motion is that the three laws he identified did not
correspond to what he wanted to find. The idea of elliptical planetary
orbits jarred his aesthetic, mystical sensibilities, and he spoke of himself as having laid a huge “cosmic egg.” Albert Camus — a popular
writer in our own times — has insightfully remarked, “Seeking what is
true is not [equivalent to] seeking what is desirable.”14 By contrast, it is
always more comfortable to imagine and live in a world one desires.
But then, this has been one of the complaints (Fichte, Marx, Freud)
about the illusion-prone disposition of religious people.
In the context of our present discussion of the ethics of global warming, the maintenance of a subject-object rationality promises to play a
continuing and necessary role — I would argue, an essential role. In
fact, unlike the energy and food crisis of 1973 – 75, we are presently
relying on the subject-object thinking of the scientific community to
define the global warming problem before it is too late. And we get
anxious about the possibility that tobacco company scientists, inclined
to place economic interest ahead of reasoned, objective judgments,
may confuse the issues and paralyze action.
Earlier I noted the critical 1963 essay by Lynn White Jr. that identified and brought attention to the European technological revolution of
the sixth through the fifteenth centuries, the development which
placed Europe at the forefront of technological innovation and development. In making his argument, White contended that over the
course of this technological development, Europe underwent a major
revision of its attitudes toward nature. With considerable weight of
historical evidence, he argued that Europe gradually freed itself from
an animistic bondage to nature and increasingly recognized its own
potential for “taming” nature. All of this occurred well before the
Copernican revolution and Descartes and represented a mundane but
pervasive form of pragmatic, subject-object thought processes.
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It is helpful to cite a few examples of the evidence that White brings
to the table. One example is the peculiar pride in tools that marked the
sepulchral art of the Celtic peoples and dated to the third century of
the common era. Another is an exhaustive study by sociologist Margaret Holden, which established, convincingly for most scholars, that,
as a rule, when technological innovation is accepted in local communities, the acceptance of further technological innovation by those same
communities becomes commonplace and tends to accelerate. Holden’s
study was centered on English parishes from the eleventh to the nineteenth centuries, but White argues that such a pattern extended over
the whole of Europe and was the case during earlier centuries, when
innovation gained acceptance in agriculture, warfare, and early industry. In addition, White calls into evidence the calendars that came into
vogue with the time of Charlemagne (A.D. 800). In contrast to the old
Roman calendars, which, in White’s words, depicted “the months as
static personifications bearing symbolic attributes,” Carolingian calendars “set the pattern for the Western Middle Ages [and] show a coercive attitude towards natural resources. The pictures change to scenes
of ploughing, harvesting, wood-chopping, people knocking down
acorns for the pigs, pig-slaughtering. Man and nature,” White states,
“are two things, and man is master.”15
The work of White makes questionable the most recent criticisms
centering on Descartes’s articulation of the subject-object cleavage as a
root cause of the ecological crisis. By contrast, let me suggest that the
post-Copernican hypothesizing in the field of epistemology is more an
effort — and a varied one at that — to describe post facto what happened with the revolution in cosmology than it is a major cause of subsequent developments in relation to abuse of the environment. The
peculiar history of technology, which only in the nineteenth century
drags science fully into its sphere of influence and partial control, is
more critical to understanding and addressing the ecological crisis
than are epistemology and what appears to be an overly idealistic-ideological reading of the subject-object dichotomy in thought processes.
Here, one has also to consider Jacob Bronowski’s long-argued hypothesis that “the hand is the cutting edge of the mind” — by which
Bronowski, as an apologist for science and as a materialist philosopher,
argues that the mind grows in response to what the hand accomplishes
—a very tactile, body-centered approach to human mind-thought reality. Writing in 1978, Brian Stock, professor of Medieval Studies at the
University of Toronto, took note of the dilemma posed by White in jux-
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taposing technology and science at an early stage of their development. But one must confess that, for the most part, White’s work has
been inadequately discussed among historians of science and intellectual historians. Certainly the current debate over the subject-object
dichotomy, with Descartes at the center of the discussion, seems seriously to neglect the consciousness-altering role of technology as an
important factor in the evolution of the subject-object dynamic. It
seems evident that a popular pragmatism and concern for utility drew
heavily upon a subject-object mode of perception, which, in this form,
has also played a valuable, humanizing role in social change.
Here let me add a further complication to the discussion of the subject-object mode of thinking. In one of her more recent books, Professor
McFague has paid singular tribute to the philosophical-theological
work of Paul Tillich (1886 – 1965), a major figure in theological and
political-philosophical discussions in Europe and America during the
first half of this century. Professor McFague ascribes to Tillich a pivotal
role in the alteration of the course of theological discussion during the
1950s and 1960s.16 Not many, perhaps, would agree with her assessment of Tillich’s contribution, but of special interest in our context is
his argument that the problem of the subject-object cleavage entered
the philosophical tradition with the work of Augustine in the late
fourth, early fifth century. Speaking out of the German Idealist tradition, Tillich, in his 1912 dissertation on the thought of Friedrich
Schelling, argued that the subject-object dichotomy is introduced into
the philosophical tradition as a result of the sense of guilt. The title of
his work hints at this point: Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings
philosophische Entwicklung (Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in
Schelling’s Philosophical Development).17
Drawing heavily upon the thought of Immanuel Kant as well as
Schelling, especially the latter’s interpretation of the Western philosophical tradition, Tillich argued that this philosophical tradition,
going back to the Greeks, has concerned itself with or played off two
basic problems over its long extent: the problem of the one and the
many and the problem of the subject-object cleavage. The former is
represented by the term mysticism and is represented as the effort to
resolve the experience of manifoldness into some sort of overarching
or underlying unity or oneness. The latter, the subject-object cleavage,
is the experience of separation and alienation, the sense of existing
over-against the world and God, in Augustine’s thought the result of
guilt and sin. Tillich outlines the various philosophical solutions that
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followed the framing of these problems and determined that most past
“solutions” were inadequate, either as single-problem solutions or as
solutions to the two problems combined. In contrast to Whitehead,
who offered the opinion that all philosophy is a footnote to Plato,
Tillich, via Schelling, argued that all philosophy has essentially been
an effort to overcome the dichotomies of the-one-and-the-many and
the subject-object cleavage by means of a limited number of “principles of identity.”
What I find interesting in Tillich’s thought at this point is that guilt,
the sense of human culpability and distance in the presence of God, is,
for Tillich, the underlying point-of-origin of the subject-object cleavage, the sense of existential estrangement from the fullness of God, or,
as Tillich preferred to say in later thought, the sense of standing out
apart from “Being-Itself.” Tillich’s ponderings at this point suggest
that it is more than feasible to regard the subject-object dichotomy as
the basis for an appeal to conscience, and a call then to some form of
reconciliation or reunion. His thought strikingly challenges the current
fashion of viewing the subject-object cleavage as an inevitable source
of domination and oppression as postulated by postmodernist and
some feminist thought. In fact, Tillich regarded the subject-object
mode of perception as the underlying condition and possibility of
human creativity and challenge. Only as the individual is able to disengage from cultural wholes, from illusory totalities of meaning, can
appeals be made to new, creative efforts at human healing. Tillich’s
argument suggests that there is, in fact, no criticism if there is no disengagement of the self. Rather than a curse, Tillich viewed the subjectobject cleavage as a call to creative endeavor, as a call to transfer
meaning from the realm of “Spirit” to that which was previously formless and lacking in meaningful structure, the vacuous facticity that
exists over-against us. It was precisely within a subject-object polarity
that Tillich saw the work of justice achieving its promise. The proposal
I make here is that, at the very least, the subject-object dichotomy is
variously rooted at points in time far distant from the seventeenth century and the modern Scientific Revolution. An objectification, a selfobjectification in the form of conscience, can engender a self-criticism
that is essential to any critique of human tendencies to dominate others. For an account of the origins of domination and oppression of the
natural order, one has certainly to look more to technology than to the
seventeenth century’s varied efforts to deal epistemologically with the
reality of the Copernican revolution.
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*****
The second line of questioning in my response to Professor McFague is
directed at her proposed corrective to subject-object thinking in the
form of her “subject-subjects” model of perception and interaction, the
latter a model proposed for the nonhuman world of nature as well as
for the realm of the interpersonal. Here, if I understand her properly,
she takes off on Martin Buber’s I-Thou concept. In his classic 1923
work, I and Thou,18 Buber espoused the reality and possibility of
authentic mutuality between persons — but then he also extended the
relationship of mutuality (rather tentatively in an appendix) to a tree
and other nonhuman subjects. Professor McFague suggests that such
inter-subjective acknowledgment and response should and can be
extended to all life forms and the environment as a whole. While I
agree with Professor McFague’s appeal to Buber’s I-Thou understanding at this point, there is also some possibility of distortion in her use
of Buber’s thought to bolster ecological consciousness.
Buber, it should be pointed out, was a theist in very much the classical mode. Thus, he maintained the possibility of an initiating role for
God in the interactions of the I-Thou relationship of which he spoke.
He rejected mystical patterns of spiritual “absorption” or “assimilation” of either party in an I-Eternal Thou relationship, a viewpoint on
mysticism in line with the thought of Søren Kierkegaard.19 What Buber
offers us in I and Thou is a theologically grounded philosophy of
“meeting” or “encounter” that presupposes the presence of a Divine
Other, an “Eternal Thou.” Buber maintained that God, the Eternal
Thou, is a nonmanipulable “other.” As such, this Other can be encountered but cannot be commanded, or manipulated, from the human
side. This Other can inform, or shine through, the reality of I-Thou
human encounters, encounters upon which Buber centered his
thought as the reality most corresponding to the encounter with God.
He argued that authentic human relationships exclude a manipulative
purpose: they must express full mutuality — always without coercion
of any sort. Both parties in such an encounter exercise full autonomy
and assume the risk of self-disclosure. Neither party can seek or have
domination. Each participant speaks from the depth of his/her selfhood without ulterior motives or purposes other than openness to
encounter itself, the meeting of the Other. For Buber, such meetings
with other human selves and with the Eternal Thou simply happen.
They occur, but they can never be programmed to occur. They are
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moments in time that transcend time; yet they leave behind the awareness and leaven of the possibility of other similar encounters. Such IThou meetings pass and the participants inevitably fall back into the
I-It world of economics, institutions, and questions of survival.
Professor McFague is fully aware of this latter feature of Buber’s
thought. For example, she writes, “Buber shrewdly pointed out that
we . . . can [not] live in an I-Thou relationship with all others all the
time. . . . But [awareness of the I-Thou relationship] could mean a substantial change in Western attitudes toward others, especially the
Third World poor and nature, a change summed up by respect, limitation, and sharing.”20 But what poses a problem for me in Professor
McFague’s use of Buber’s thought in the present context of global
warming is that the call for ecosystem balance and preservation is fundamentally a survival question. To me, this means primarily programs
and policies, exhortations, and, at points, new restrictions on human
freedom. It means discipline and ethical talk of ends and means, duties
and obligations. In my mind, the thought of Immanuel Kant is a more
realistic ethical resource for addressing the ecological crisis than
Buber’s faith-rooted exposition of the I-Thou relationship, one which
provocatively presupposes an Eternal Thou beyond capture and
beyond human use in solving yet another pressing human problem.
In short, though Professor McFague rather scorns a utilitarian mindset, she strikes me as profoundly utilitarian (in her meaning of the
term) in her effort to frame a “deeper spirituality” as a means of
addressing the “seriousness of global warming.” On one hand she
affirms a rather stark but realistic appraisal of the environmental problem: “[S]ince we created the problem, presumably, we can do something about it”21 —an appraisal Kant certainly would have understood.
Yet on the other hand, she proposes the project of altering individual
and social consciousness to inspire the ethical commitment essential, it
seems, to a solution. To be sure, Professor McFague offers the necessary disclaimer that her proposal of a subject-subjects model for
human consciousness — not just for Christians or Westerners — represents an absolute of any sort. All models, she assures, are “partial and
relative”; all models “are social constructions.”22 Yet her own model,
she also asserts, “is not . . . esoteric, rare, or limited to Christians. Its
basis lies deep within all of us.”23
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III. On Engineering Consciousness
These remarks bring me to a third and final line of questioning that
relates to the entire project of consciousness engineering and alteration. Professor McFague comes to the problem of climate change with
the perspective of a successful decades-long feminist struggle to raise
consciousness about the repressed status of women in First World
societies. Much positive gain has been accomplished in this realm, and
much remains to be done. My question in this regard is whether or not
human consciousness and awareness is as malleable as our author
supposes. Advocates of the Enlightenment believe in progress and the
infinite malleability of human nature; Professor McFague seems to
share this outlook in her own proposed project to shape or fix human
consciousness.
This modeling-of-consciousness (read: shaping-of-consciousness)
idea represents an interesting concept, one Professor McFague has
worked with in earlier books as she has attempted to provide alternative concepts for God. In reflecting upon this idea, I surmise that there
are different sources for this sort of image-fashioning that underlies
her usage. But the lead source, obviously, would seem to be the successful use of modeling in some fields of science, such as in the discovery of the double helix by Watson and Crick or Bohr’s modeling of the
structure of the atom in nuclear physics. Modeling in the science field,
however, serves a significantly different function from what it does in
Professor McFague’s field. In the sciences, modeling does not in and of
itself deny a correspondence theory of truth. It serves a useful function
in helping the inquiring mind to “visualize” what is not accessible to
sensory description, even when supplemented by technological instrumentation. It has pragmatic utility and, one might add, presupposes a
subject-object relationship at a fundamental level. But Professor
McFague’s use of this idea, as already suggested, focuses upon the
subjective consciousness itself. It is inner-directed, not outwarddirected; it is self-address with the purpose of self-transformation. She
argues that the changed consciousness that will ensue from the subject-subjects model will significantly benefit the environment while
simultaneously contributing to a sense of human well-being that can
be described as “abundant life.”
While at some points Professor McFague writes in a reserved tone
about the modest, helpful intent of her contribution toward the wellbeing of planet earth—and no contribution toward such an end can be
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lightly discounted — at other points she implies a mind-altering revision of human self-awareness, a reconstitution of human consciousness that extends beyond religious communities and cultural locations,
whether in the First or Third Worlds. What I find unclear about the
modeling-of-a-new-consciousness project is whether the projection of
the subject-subjects model is intended to build upon an implicit love of
nature that only needs an adequate model to accomplish its further
development, or whether the model itself will act upon our varied levels of consciousness and induce, of itself, the necessary, more positive
relationship to the natural world. Perhaps she would say both.
Some, however, would argue that human consciousness is not quite
as easily engineered as Professor McFague supposes. Her assumption
of a very malleable human consciousness is suggestive of an optimistic
Enlightenment mindset, one which saw the elimination of human
ignorance and superstition as the chief means to a redemptive, future
social order, with nature as a source of support and inspiration. The
Enlightenment, however, suffered disenchantment in its “nature-assupport-of-human-goodness” supposition when it was forced to deal
with the devastation of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. And earlier, it was
Kepler’s discovery of the elliptical planetary orbits, Galileo’s telescopic
observations, and Newton’s mathematical computations on gravity
that established the Copernican sun-centered world and, correspondingly, shattered the comfortable belief in an earth-centered universe.
Consciousness was altered also by the nova of 1572, which undid for
Tycho Brahe and others in his generation the notion of the changeless
perfection of the celestial spheres. Then, in more recent times, it was
the March 1993 discovery by Eugene and Carolyn Shoemaker, along
with astronomer David Levy, of a fragmented comet on a collision
course with Jupiter, and its impact on the surface of that planet in July
1994, that alerted an earthly audience to the frequency of such heavenly catastrophes. This event is recasting people’s awareness of the
vulnerability of the earth itself to such astronomical events and a
recently computed one-in-a-thousand chance that a comet or asteroid
will collide with earth once in an average human lifetime. All of this
suggests that events outside of human control have in the past played
a singular role in shaping human consciousness. By contrast, it is less
clear that self-conscious efforts at design, or redesign, of human consciousness have been equally successful in effecting changes in a
Weltanschauung.
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This, however, is not to say that significant historical change has not
been accomplished by appeal to deeply held shared values, especially
the metahistorical value of equality, as expressed in the Declaration of
Independence, the Civil Rights movement, or the Feminist movement.
But one must say that history is a deceptive partner in the matter of
consciousness change. Much human struggle and sacrifice have previously gone into efforts to alter the course of history, but, perhaps more
often than not, an intended historical purpose has yielded unexpected
and inexplicable outcomes, as in the French and Russian Revolutions,
the unanticipated destructiveness of World War I, the troubled heritage of the Vietnam War. The course of events can run counter to
human intentionality and show deeply held beliefs to be illusory.
Added to all of this is the strange history of technology, which, while it
constantly enhances human power and sensory experience, can also
subtly alter in unforeseen ways human consciousness and radically
disrupt social and economic orders previously perceived to be adequate, and even sometimes equitable.
In the light of such evidence, it would seem apparent that human
consciousness constitutes a very elusive subject — or object — of control. A modeling aimed at engineering consciousness — even with the
aid of poetry and appeals to “socially constructed,” yet “transcendental,” values of equality and justice — hardly seems to address the issue
at hand of environmental degradation in the form of climate change.
This phenomenon seems likely to be addressed more effectively on the
level of a survival appeal, rather than on an eclectic marshalling of aesthetic and personal relational motivations. The problem, however, is of
such a nature that all sorts of battalions, filled with quite varied enlistees, should be welcomed to this fray — and Professor McFague has
styled an appeal that can also enlist some for the common struggle.
While this can be affirmed, it can nonetheless be suggested that subject-object thinking may, in fact, provide its own worthy and very
effective battalions for the effort ahead.
IV. Final Statement
Let me conclude with a brief statement of my own perspective on the
problem of climate change and the larger question of an environmental
ethic, a perspective implicit in the criticism I have already offered. I
also entertain a modest view of the theological contribution to this ethical debate. Professor McFague, in company with Lynn White Jr., is, it
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appears, committed to the cause of the “re-enchantment” of nature as a
necessary means of addressing the problem of the human abuse of the
environment. I, however, am less convinced of the effectiveness of a
“designer theology” to this end. By this I mean a theology designed to
meet a specific sort of human problem and need, and which then takes
on all-encompassing dimensions, Hegel-like “world-historical” dimensions. That kind of theology strikes me as too transparently “made in
our own image,” and, in my mind, reflects a deeply rooted narcissism
that has been well noted and commented upon in our time.24
When it comes to the matter of climate change or of “killer asteroids,” I believe the ethical problem becomes basically a survival question. And a survival question such as this is simply a broad human
question, one rooted in the fundamental instinct of self- and speciespreservation. These sorts of questions can be also addressed theologically, but a theological read of the situation is by its very nature a faith
read. By this I mean to say only that if the matter of God’s grace is at
the center of Christian faith, then it seems to me simply evident that no
Christian could want to bring a premature end to the earthly praise of
God, a praise manifested also in determined efforts to work at a
human healing and community. Whereas Professor McFague seems to
want to work toward the discovery of an “abundant life,” I am concerned with working from the fragments of grace-in-community
already present among us and working toward its continuation and
further development.
I probably share with Professor McFague, though she has not articulated it explicitly, a concern that a myopic and obsessive otherworldliness can prove very destructive of this world and thus also of the
praise of God in Christ. Otherworldliness of this sort, an otherworldliness with a primary focus on what is to come after this life, is, of
course, not unique to Christianity. An answer to death is common to
virtually all religious traditions, but where the “answer” to death
obscures the responsibility for and to life, critical judgments and determinations need to be made. Regard for nature and the natural world is
not lacking in the Christian tradition and is vital to it, despite the peculiar development of technology on the soil of Medieval Christian
Europe. Certainly, the figure of St. Francis of Assisi is a reminder of an
inclusive earthly compassion. But such compassion and understanding is also found among nonmystical theological types such as the sixteenth-century reformer Martin Bucer, who in 1523 deplored the
human abuse of the creaturely realm. He wrote that humankind, in the
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presence of “all creatures,” should so direct its “being” in all its actions
that it “seeks not its own, but only the welfare of . . . neighbors,” sisters
and brothers, “for the honor of God.” Bucer enjoined us to value all
creatures, not alone in their usefulness to humankind, but to the end
that they should be treated “for their own welfare and proper honor.”25
Some conceptual formulae may have changed; the language in our
time has inevitably undergone adjustment. But the substance of Christian spiritual address, in the Bucer case, is palpably in accord with a
Christian ecological calling in our own day. On this matter of a Christian ecological calling, Professor McFague and I certainly share a common mind. We disagree strongly, however, about the efficacy of a
salvific human healing achieved through a manipulation of human
consciousness. We live in a real world, a God-given world — only in
part in a “socially constructed” world.
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